Policy and practice: the EU referendum, planning and the environment: where now for the UK? by Cowell, Richard John Westley
The referendum of 23 June 2016, in which the UK voted to leave the European Union, has potentially 
far-reaching implications for planning, especially its interface with environmental policy. While the five 
months since the referendum show stability in the worlds of planning practice, moves to renegotiate 
the UK’s relationship with Europe raise a number of important questions: will we see an erosion of 
the firm environmental standards and targets characteristic of EU environmental policy? Will business 
interests and infrastructure proponents be successful in arguing that Brexit requires yet further growth-
supporting measures? How will the evident salience of immigration, sovereignty and identity concerns 
shape planning and environmental policy? Will the devolved governments thwart or redirect the ‘leave’ 
process? Alongside responses to specific institutional changes, planning and environmental bodies 
will need to respond to a political context in which elites are mistrusted, the benefits of globalisation 
and supra-national governance are questioned, and ‘putting Britain first’ is a discourse with increased 
traction.
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Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of  the 
European Union (EU) delivered its result, with 51.9 per cent of  voters supporting 
leave against 48.1 per cent voting for remain. As a result, after 43 years of  member-
ship, the UK has begun the political process of  exiting the EU1 – or ‘Brexit’ for short.
There is consensus on two things. First, that the effects of  the UK leaving the EU 
could be pervasive, touching many aspects of  the economy, society and politics within 
the UK and beyond. Second, there is a consensus that any effects are highly uncertain. 
Uncertainty swirls around short-term legal and political questions: will ‘Brexit’ also 
mean leaving the single market? Does the current government have the legitimacy 
to determine what Brexit means without securing the consent of  Parliament, the 
electorate or the devolved governments of  Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland? 
Uncertainty also surrounds any longer-term consequences as businesses, markets, 
prospective migrants and political parties respond to the unfolding situation. Beyond 
1 Technically the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, which only became the European 
Union in 1993 with the signing of  the Maastricht Treaty. For simplicity, this review refers to the European Union 
(EU) throughout.
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these two points of  consensus, perspectives on what could and should happen next are 
as divided as the referendum campaign itself.
Given this, identifying the implications for planning is a hazardous enterprise. 
Certainly, the referendum result has been presented as presaging an era of  policy 
openness (Usherwood, 2016). However, one may question whether Brexit necessarily 
moves the evolution of  UK planning onto some wholly new trajectory. For all the 
uncertainties, some scenarios for UK planning and cognate aspects of  environmental 
policy post-Brexit are highly credible because they represent an extrapolation of  
trends already powerful prior to June 2016, and have been boosted by the political 
dynamics of  the referendum event itself.
Table 1 The United Kingdom’s EU referendum timeline
January 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron promises that should the Conservative Party win 
a majority in the 2015 general election he would pursue a renegotiation of the 
UK’s relationship with the EU and then hold a referendum on EU membership. 
Subsequent proposed legislation included a deadline for that referendum of 
31 December 2017
2015 Conservatives fight the 2015 general election with a manifesto promise to hold 
an in–out referendum on EU membership; most other parties include support 
for, or proposals on, EU referenda in their manifestos.
7 May 2015 The Conservative Party win the general election, following which legislation is 
passed (the European Union Referendum Act 2015) making provision for an 
advisory referendum on the UK’s EU membership.
23 June 2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, producing a 
51.9% vote to leave
24 June 2016 Prime Minister David Cameron resigns
13 July 2016 Theresa May replaces David Cameron as prime minister
2 October 2016 Theresa May announces that her government will trigger Article 50 of the 
Lisbon Treaty at the end of March 2017, beginning the formal process of 
securing a separation agreement with the European Union, in a process 
formally limited to two years.
3 November 2016 The High Court rules that the government does not have the authority to 
trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament; the government appeals the 
ruling, with the case due to reach the Supreme Court on 7 December 2016 
[AQ1]
Taking up this argument, this review of  policy and practice outlines and assesses 
the likely effects of  the UK’s departure from EU membership on planning, especially 
its interface with environmental policy. It draws upon information available at the 
time of  writing (November 2016), which is mostly opinion-based writing in the profes-
sional press, the blogosphere and government speeches and announcements, backed 
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by interviews with practitioners.2 Table 1 places this period in a longer time frame. 
The review begins by summarising how land use planning in the UK has been shaped 
by EU membership, then outlines different Brexit scenarios, before considering key 
issues that may emerge once the leave process gets under way: the risks of  further 
deregulation of  planning and environmental policy; intensified pro-growth policies; 
the influence of  concerns around immigration, identity and sovereignty; and the 
devolution dimension.
The Europeanisation of UK planning
On the face of  it, planning in the UK has not been deeply affected by the EU. The 
founding principles and institutional norms of  the planning system are mainly products 
of  the UK’s legal and administrative context with relatively little influence from 
abroad (Newman and Thornley, 1996; Nadin and Shaw, 1997). Moreover, within the 
framework of  EU membership, land-use planning remains largely a national matter, 
as EU legislation in this sphere can only be adopted by unanimity (Article 192(2), 
Treaty on European Union). Consequently, UK national and devolved governments 
have been by far the greatest shapers of  the procedures, organisational structures and 
goals of  planning.
Nevertheless, planning is a broad and porous policy sphere, highly open to external 
influences. As a result, policies emanating from the EU have driven a wide-ranging set 
of  changes to the system, even if  ‘[t]he overwhelming majority of  these measures are 
not focused explicitly on planning’ (Bishop et al., 2000, 309; Haigh, 1989; Morphet, 
2013; Tewdwr-Jones and Williams, 2001). These influences can be organised into four 
main groups (Cowell and Owens, 2016).
• Firmer environmental standards. A key effect of  EU membership has been to
institute firmer, substantive standards for environmental protection than UK 
governments might have been disposed to do. Prime examples are the nature-
conservation directives for Birds (79/409/EEC) and Habitats (92/43/EEC), 
where the need to demonstrate ‘imperative reasons of  overriding public interest’ 
(Commission of  the European Communities, 2000 [AQ2]) sets a stiff test for 
projects that threaten sites and species designated under EU legislation. For 
air quality, UK standards are underpinned by the 2008 Ambient Air Quality 
Directive (2008/50/EC), which lays down precise limit values for a range of  
pollutants and requires action to meet them. Such directives set the context 
within which planning operates and reduce the scope for domestic actors to 
trade environmental quality for economic goals.
• Shaping decision-making procedures. EU membership has had the effect of
2 Six semi-structured interviews were conducted with planning professionals in the public and private sectors.
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promoting public participation, improving access to justice and enhancing the 
availability of  environmental information. With the directives on Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) (85/337/EC and subsequent amendments) and the 
directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (2001/42/EC), EU 
action has formalised what might otherwise have been a more flexible and 
voluntaristic British approach (Jordan, 2002), standardising the information that 
must be provided, and enabling proposals to be scrutinised and decision-makers 
to be held to account (Sheate, 2012). In many instances, EIA and SEA have led 
to tangible – if  generally incremental – improvements to projects and plans 
(Glasson et al., 2012[AQ3]). The Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) 
also has an important role securing compliance with the Aarhus Convention.3
• Integrated spatial and environmental governance. The EU has been a promoter
of  ‘joined-up’ or integrated approaches to planning, where actors in different 
sectors (e.g. transport, environment, housing, energy) strive to coordinate 
their strategies, and has encouraged planning at spatial scales better attuned 
to ecological, economic and social processes. Here the EU has exerted influ-
ence through the generation of  ideas, notably the much-discussed European 
Spatial Development Perspective and its successors (Morphet, 2015), from which 
concepts of  sectorally integrated ‘spatial planning’ influenced previous Labour 
governments’ Regional Spatial Strategies in England (Haughton et al., 2010) 
and national spatial planning by the devolved governments (Harris et al., 2002). 
EU funding has also incentivised action, with the INTERREG programme 
designed to foster collaboration between regions in different member states on 
cross-border and transnational issues (Colomb, 2007; Dühr and Nadin, 2007). 
UK planning authorities have been frequent participants. The EU Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) has also been flagged as stimulating a 
‘comprehensive, holistic and sustainable approach’ to water policy, with ramifi-
cations for planning (Carter and White, 2012; 2331; White and Howe, 2003).
• Infrastructure and economic regeneration. An important part of  the context for
planning in many parts of  the UK is EU funding for the economic development 
of  lagging regions and deepening market integration. The implications for land 
use planning are especially clear for infrastructure. EU structural funds have been 
important in supporting projects represented as having economic growth benefits, 
such as roads, with the EU also providing policies and resources for promoting 
‘Trans-European Transport Networks’, addressing ‘border crossings, missing links 
and bottlenecks’ in cross-EU mobility (Dühr et al., 2010 [AQ4]). The EU has also 
promoted the integration of  energy networks across its territory (EC, 2011). As 
well as drawing up strategies and priority corridors for gas pipelines and electricity 
3 The UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters
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grids, the Commission has also pushed measures that accelerate decision making, 
by defining certain infrastructures as ‘projects of  European significance’ and then 
instituting fixed time frames for determining consents. In this sphere the UK is 
seen by Europe as something of  a leader (Marshall, 2014).
So EU membership has undeniably impacted UK planning, directly in terms 
of  planning procedures but also through shaping the wider regulatory and develop-
mental context. Arguably, these effects have been the most significant (and enduring) 
in the environmental sphere, given the EU’s acknowledged importance in shaping 
the national environmental policy of  member states (Burns et al., 2016). EU legisla-
tion and targets also shape development patterns in spheres like waste management, 
driving the move away from landfill, and renewable energy expansion, in turn 
requiring planning responses.
However, specifying the ‘additional effect’ of  EU membership on domestic 
planning policy and practice is tricky. This is partly because research has tended to 
focus on the initial adoption of  EU measures and not on the long-term effects of  
implementation, where CJEU enforcement action and practitioners’ decisions can 
have big effects (Borrass et al., 2015). Charting subtler, longer-term effects on learning 
(organisational and individual) and the reframing of  objectives for planning is always 
challenging (Colomb, 2007), not helped by the UK government’s politically motivated 
tendency to obscure when UK domestic policy is driven by EU agendas (Morphet, 
2013). The overall ‘net effect’ of  EU membership on planning outcomes also requires 
careful deciphering. As well as promoting environmental protection, the EU’s agendas 
for free trade and market integration, economic competitiveness and labour market 
mobility – which have all intensified since the Lisbon Treaty – have shaped the nature, 
level and location of  development and are thus implicated in the environmental 
pressures of  growth. Indeed, EU economic agendas can challenge and undermine 
the EU’s own environmental-protection policies (Richardson, 1997; Pustelnik, 2016). 
Understanding the effect of  Brexit on planning thus needs to consider different dimen-
sions – environmental, economic, political – and their interactions.
The meaning of Brexit and road towards it
The effects of  Brexit on planning will depend substantially on the nature of  any exit 
agreement negotiated between the UK government and the EU. Should the UK 
government seek to leave the EU but remain a member of  the European Economic 
Area (EEA) (and thus the single market), then the UK will need to remain compliant 
with some 80 per cent of  the EU environmental acquis, such as EIA. However, some 
of  the most significant planning-related measures – notably the Habitats and Birds 
Directives – would not be required (ENDS Report, 2015c), giving UK governments 
the scope to make changes.
Richard Cowell158
If  Britain leaves the EU and does not remain within the EEA, then the oppor-
tunities to revise domestic legislation would be less constrained. The consequences 
would then be contingent on how far environmental issues become relevant to any 
alternative trade agreements negotiated, on the priorities of  the government of  the 
day and on the balance of  power between different interests. Environmental regula-
tions attached to traded products might be likeliest to remain in place. However, one 
can hypothesise that land-based issues, always sensitive to concerns about national 
sovereignty and with a more complex, indirect relation to trade, would be weaker 
contenders for inclusion in future trade agreements.
At the time of  writing, the likely form of  any exit agreement is unclear but 
evidently subject to profound dilemmas. Although the government is not issuing a 
‘running commentary’ on its approach to negotiations with the EU, ministers have 
signalled their opposition to any arrangement that prevented the UK government 
exercising control over immigration (May, 2016). Meanwhile, European leaders 
have underlined that free movement of  EU citizens is fundamental to retaining 
access to the single market (as it is with Norway, for example). The result is a 
challenge ‘of  a complexity and magnitude no British government has faced since 
1945’ (Peston, 2016). On one side is considerable business and political pressure to 
remain within the EEA, which also enables access to a range of  EU programmes 
on, inter alia, science and the environment. On the other side, controlling 
immigration has transmuted from a key platform of  the leave campaign and the 
Eurosceptic press to being represented as the authentic ‘will of  the people’ by the 
referendum vote and thus non-negotiable. Delivering an exit agreement palat-
able to all parties seems impossible; consequently autumn 2016 was filled with 
questions about the democratic process by which the UK’s negotiating position 
will be developed and approved.
In the face of  such high-consequence decisions, the government has acted to foster 
short-term stability. The government set out its preferred timetable for Brexit: it has 
stated the intention to trigger Article 50 of  the Lisbon Treaty at the end of  March 
2017, thus formally beginning exit negotiations, which according to the article must 
then be completed in two years. In addition, the government has issued a flurry of  
assurances that it will honour current financial commitments to recipients of  EU 
agricultural support, structural funds and science programmes (Hammond, 2016).4 
On the legal front, the government has proposed a Great Repeal Bill which, on the 
day of  exit, will instantly annul the 1972 European Communities Act that has given 
EU law legal effect in the UK and convert all its provisions into UK law. It has been 
described as offering ‘snapshot transposition’ (Elliott, 2016), and seeks to achieve the 
neatening effect of  keeping the UK compliant with EU legislation for as long as it 
4 In some instances until the date of  leaving the EU, or until 2020, or for the duration of  any specific agreement 
entered into.
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remains a member, meaning that altering the institutional inheritance of  the EU 
might not begin until 2019 at the earliest. That is the ideal; legal realities may be 
considerably more complex (EDIE, 2016b).
Implications for planning
By autumn 2016, planning and environmental interests found themselves between big 
questions for which answers are awaited, on the one hand, and an apparent continu-
ation of  the status quo ex ante, on the other. Perhaps it is wise, then, for practitioners to 
‘leave the panicking to others’ (Mark Tewdwr-Jones quoted in Dewar, 2016). As inter-
viewees commented, the planning system has always coped with change and there 
is no reason to believe that it will not adapt to whichever variant of  Brexit emerges. 
However, even where practitioners feel that ‘planning won’t change’, there was a 
recognition that ‘everything around it will’ (interview), and these shifts in the wider 
context could have profound implications.
In assessing the effects of  Brexit, however, it is important to remember that 
planning in the UK is already entrained in processes of  profound change driven 
by domestic political agendas. Since the start of  the twenty-first century, successive 
reforms to the system have pursued deregulation and simplification in the name of  
economic competitiveness, with representations of  planning as a ‘barrier’ to growth 
being wielded repeatedly to promote ‘efficiency and expedition’ (Samuels, 2015, 646), 
especially for infrastructure investment. The effects have been to increase the power of  
developers and reinforce growth agendas whilst encouraging a dismantling of  effec-
tive strategic planning, especially in England, eclipsing attention to complex issues 
like sustainability and spatial equity, and creating an ill-conducive context for devel-
oping more cohesive, integrated approaches to planning (Dühr and Nadin, 2007). 
The opportunities available to those who would use the planning system to promote 
environmental sustainability have been diminished (DCLGSC, 2014), dissipating the 
environmental-protection role of  the system overall (Cowell, 2013; Lee et al., 2013).
Given this, one can acknowledge the ‘cataclysmic’ nature of  the referendum result 
and resulting uncertainty about the future, but still pose focused questions about the 
future. In short, do we have good reason to expect the EU referendum result to alter 
the dominant directions of  change for planning in the UK?
Thinking about the future also means looking beyond legal analyses of  possibili-
ties and constraints to consider how the referendum itself, as a ‘political moment’, 
generated impetus for certain agendas and actors while marginalising others. This too 
indicates which scenarios might have most traction.
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Towards further deregulation?
There is broad agreement that ‘[t]he UK’s membership of  the EU has improved the 
UK’s approach to environmental protection and ensured that the UK environment 
has been better protected’ (House of  Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 
2016a, 28) and, concomitantly, widespread fear from the environmental sector that 
the referendum result would lead to those improvements stagnating or going into 
reverse (EDIE, 2016a; ENDS Report, 2016a; 2016b[AQ5]). The EU has helped foster 
a coherent, ambitious and stable framework of  environmental regulation in the UK, 
which is now at risk of  becoming fragmented and subject to short-termist, politically 
driven changes in the name of  economic growth (indeed, see House of  Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2016b).
Planning would be affected by such an outturn and, as a policy sphere more profoundly 
shaped by national legislation, shows the credibility of  such fears. Not only has there has 
been an erosion of  environmental agendas within planning policy, as discussed above, 
but also EU membership has evidently provided a bulwark against further change. For 
example, the National Planning Policy Framework (for England), which collapsed a 
library of  planning policy into a single document, still states that ‘[p]lanning policies and 
decisions must reflect and where relevant promote relevant EU obligations and statutory 
requirements’ (DCLG, 2012, para. 2). Yet government ministers regularly criticised EU 
‘regulatory creep … imposing additional and expensive requirements on the planning 
system’, all the worse for being ‘over and above long-standing, domestic environmental 
safeguards in planning law’.5 Such remarks exemplify both the persistent equation of  
environmental regulation with ‘cost’ and an equally persistent national chauvinism, often 
evident in previous government dealings with the EU, that policy ideas from abroad add 
little to domestic practices (Haigh, 1989; Jordan, 2002).
There are further warning signs. The business sector evidently enjoys close access 
to government deregulation agendas, with EU regulation in its sights (see Business 
Taskforce, 2013). In various areas the UK government is already dragging its feet 
or defaulting on implementation of  EU policy, most notably on improving urban 
air quality where infraction fines are a real threat (ENDS Report, 2016a; House of  
Lords, 2016). Procedural rights around environmental decision-making are another 
point of  tension. CJEU decisions have underscored the standing of  environmental 
organisations in representing legitimate public interests and pressed the UK govern-
ment on improving financial protection for those bringing environmental cases before 
the courts (Maurici and Moules, 2014; ENDS Report, 2015b), while the UK domestic 
agenda has pushed in the opposite direction, including sustained downward pressure 
on access to judicial review (Rice, 2016).
5 From Eric Pickles MP, Hansard, 6 December 2012, Written Ministerial Statements, Communities and Local 
Government, Planning Administration, cols 71–72 WS.
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Looking back at the referendum debate and associated media coverage, environ-
mental aspects of  EU membership were notable by their virtual absence (ENDS 
Report, 2016b). Climate change is the exception, with the referendum prompting 
government affirmations of  UK support for the Paris Agreement. One reading of  this 
situation is that in the referendum ‘the public did not vote for a race to the bottom’ for 
environmental policy (ENDS Report, 2016a, 6). Yet arguably environmental regula-
tion was present in the process, in the language of  ‘red tape’, something both ‘remain’ 
and ‘leave’ campaigners expressed a keenness to reduce (Cameron, 2015). Overall, 
environment issues received little impetus from the referendum.
The planning profession evidently recognises the plausibility of  future deregula-
tion, but to date seems relatively sanguine. In the short term nothing is changing: 
new EU directives are still being transposed into national legislation (Carpenter, 2016 
[AQ6]); much depends on whether the UK renegotiates membership of  the EEA. 
Looking further ahead, only incremental changes are expected (Dunton, 2016). The 
sheer complexity of  unpicking environmental safeguards is deemed likely to deter 
major change (Garlick, 2016). Commentators regularly argue that, even outside the 
EU, the fact that the UK has ratified almost forty international treaties means that 
many environmental-protection obligations will remain (see Macrory, 2016; Woolford 
and Hunt, 2016). Is this optimistic? Most international agreements lack mechanisms 
for enforcement and redress, yet with EU environmental policy it has often been 
precisely the effect of  infraction proceedings, legal decisions and potential fines that 
has improved implementation on the ground (Borrass et al., 2015).
Numerous environmental bodies have expressed intentions to both defend and 
enhance the UK’s environmental policy framework post-Brexit (ENDS Report, 
2016a), and there are opportunities for gains. For example, the replacement of  the 
Common Agricultural Policy could herald moves towards a more sustainable and 
integrated approach to land management (House of  Lords, 2016). However, they do 
so in political circumstances much less auspicious than the 1980s and 1990s when EU 
environmental policy expanded most significantly. Since 2010, UK governments have 
abolished major environmental bodies (the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution and the Sustainable Development Commission) and barred statutory 
conservation bodies from commenting publicly on government policy, and austerity 
has greatly reduced staffing and expertise across the public sector, in national and 
local government and within various agencies. Advocates of  maintaining the EU 
environmental policy inheritance are also up against organisations that may view the 
opportunities of  Brexit very differently.
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A new context for economic development
If  environmental issues were marginalised in the referendum debate, effects on the 
economy were centre stage, with the ‘remain’ camp making the economic risks of  
leaving the EU pivotal to their campaign. The possibility of  economic downturn was 
evidently a source of  anxiety to planners, especially those on the development industry 
side. Commentators suggested that development schemes may become vulnerable 
and so ‘councils need to be open to re-examining schemes viability’ [AQ7] (Garlick, 
2016, 3; Dewar, 2016; Gardiner, 2016).
As yet, the referendum outcome has had little obvious effect. Planning consult-
ants reported short-term ‘tremors’ after the outcome, as market uncertainties affected 
share prices of  housebuilding companies. The main effect was to cause a pause to 
development projects during July and August. By September the pipeline of  projects 
was back on track, with little evidence that Brexit of  itself  was pushing developers 
to renegotiate social or environmental obligations. This steadiness is attributed to 
beliefs that the fundamentals driving the demand for housing and other projects are 
essentially sound.
Economic indicators may shift as the contours of  any exit and trade agreements 
emerge (Dunton, 2016); however, Brexit is not an event with purely ‘objective’ proper-
ties, but something that can be represented and mobilised in support of  particular 
agendas. Much will depend on whether different interests represent Brexit as a crisis 
or an opportunity. The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath suggests that business 
and development interests can be particularly effective in using arguments about 
uncertainty and the need to stimulate growth to articulate the case for speeding up 
planning and more growth-accommodating environmental regulation (see Business 
Taskforce, 2013). An important post-referendum political narrative is that the UK 
should become ‘a global champion of  free trade’, an agenda suggested to require ‘very 
ambitious deregulation of  its economy’ (Booth et al., 2015), further cuts to corpora-
tion tax (Spence, 2016), and/or much greater international access to UK markets and 
public assets. None of  these steps appear helpful to public-interest planning, social 
justice or environmental policy.
Infrastructure projects have been pulled both ways in post-referendum planning 
debates, being ‘under threat’ from the prospects of  reduced funding (Dewar, 2016), 
especially with loss of  access to EU structural and investment funds (Carpenter, 2016 
[AQ6]), but also represented as more essential than ever, given the need to demon-
strate that the UK is ‘open for business’, including by planning commentators (Garlick, 
2016; Walker, 2016). The latter perspective seems to be ascendant, with the govern-
ment giving its support to a series of  long-controversial projects since 23 June: Hinkley 
Point C nuclear power station, a third runway at Heathrow and reaffirmations of  
commitment to the HS2 high-speed rail line (May, 2016).
What gives infrastructure projects wider significance is that, historically, conflicts 
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about major projects have often played a formative role in debates about sustain-
ability, public policy and environmental standards (Cowell and Owens, 2006). An 
example would be how specific decisions on projects have shaped the interpretation 
of  EU environmental policy, notably the strength of  wildlife protection given by 
the Habitats and Birds Directives (Borrass et al., 2015). Those concerned about the 
possible erosion of  EU-based environmental standards would thus be wise to look 
closely at how debates around politically popular infrastructure projects inform wider 
policy, as proponents press for steps to cheapen and de-risk delivery. One obvious 
focus is prospective new runways at Heathrow, where air quality already approaches 
EU permitted levels (ENDS Report, 2015a).
Politics of sovereignty, identity and immigration
It would be superficially easy to frame debates around Brexit and planning along 
familiar axes of  environment and economy, but this omits a set of  issues for which the 
referendum was a lightning rod – about immigration, sovereignty and identity, borne 
along by wider ‘undercurrents of  disillusionment and disconnection’ (Campbell, 
2016, 489) from the status quo. Analysis of  referendum voting suggests that, for many 
people, beliefs about the erosion of  British sovereignty, loss of  identity and controlling 
immigration outweighed messages of  economic risk attached to leaving the EU and 
the single market (Curtice, 2016).
Since June such issues have hung in the air, scarcely touching ground with the 
worlds of  planning or environmental policy. Discussion within the planning profes-
sion has focused on immediate, material implications, i.e. how tighter national 
immigration controls may affect migration patterns and, in turn, the veracity of  
population data and housing projections underpinning calculations of  housing need 
(Geoghegan, 2016; Dewar, 2016; Dunton, 2016; Marrs, 2016). Public concern at the 
effects of  ‘incomers’ on housing supply and greenfield development is familiar terri-
tory to planners, making it hard to discern whether the post-Brexit atmosphere on 
immigration will affect technical practicalities on the ground. Effects on the labour 
market for planners are also limited; the distinctive institutional evolution of  British 
planning producing a system staffed mainly by Brits. UK planning schools have much 
more immediate reasons for anxiety. Non-British EU academics make up 17 per cent 
of  teaching and research posts in UK universities, which also face diminished access 
to EU research money, disadvantage in attracting European students, and apparent 
government determination to keep labelling international students ‘immigrants’ and 
include them within strategies to reduce net immigration (Rudd, 2016).
Assessing the wider implications is inevitably more speculative. The geographi-
cally and socially divided Britain revealed by patterns of  referendum voting (Harris 
and Charlton, 2016) prompted demand that more attention be given to places and 
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populations ‘left behind’ by globalisation, which exhibit a sense of  profound aliena-
tion from ‘metropolitan elites’ (May, 2016) and ‘experts’ (Campbell, 2016). Therein 
lie opportunities to ‘re-articulate the case for strategic planning’ (Ellis, 2016b, 295), 
especially if  post-referendum political rhetoric of  healing divisions of  wealth and 
opportunity translate into interest in more spatially sensitive and just development 
policies. For such opportunities, the Town and Country Planning Association has 
asserted the relevance of  its values – ‘inclusive, practical, hopeful’ – as the basis of  
‘alternatives to fear and isolationism’ (Ellis, 2016a, 267).
If  there is some agreement on the need to address Britain’s deepening social 
divisions, any relationship between material inequality, voting ‘leave’ and what 
actually might be done is obviously more complex. The fact that parts of  the UK 
in receipt of  significant EU structural funds expressed a strong vote to leave, such as 
the south Wales valleys (Wyn Jones, 2016), raises profound questions about the extent 
to which dominant regeneration strategies have improved people’s lives. Moreover, 
Dorling’s analysis shows that 59 per cent of  those voting ‘leave’ were middle-class 
(social groups A, B and C1), not the most economically marginalised (Dorling, 2016). 
It may be highly indicative that the researchers that best predicted the referendum 
outcome drew on analysis of  social media conversations.6 Better engagement with 
publics in places and about places, including by planning practitioners and academics, 
can be valuable, but risks remaining disconnected from other sites where interpreta-
tions of  the world, threats to it and desirable responses are produced, circulated and 
consumed. It ignores the political process, and the way in which political groups like 
UKIP and others have actively cultivated anti-establishment, anti-immigration and 
identity concerns, and enjoyed progressively greater influence on social, media and 
policy agendas.
Referendum slogans like ‘Take back control’ and ‘Getting our country back’ 
resonated widely. Such a sharp reassertion of  notions of  UK (and especially English) 
national sovereignty (Keating, 2016) confronts the ethos of  environmental and planning 
movements that have drawn strength from articulating wider, international interests 
(Menon, 2016). Cities and regions may well have achieved ‘leverage for place-based 
development to local politicians and communities’ by working with the European 
Commission (Sykes and Schulze Baing, 2016, 210), and it is well acknowledged that 
environmental NGOs regularly appealed to the EU to expose deficiencies in the UK 
government’s implementation of  EU environmental policy. Are such actions now 
precisely the kind of  circumvention of  national sovereignty that, for ‘leave’ supporters, 
Brexit was designed to eliminate?
It is hard to discern where and how small changes might foretell bigger shifts. 
At the small scale, planning-practitioner interviewees often suggested that if  Brexit 
creates scope to revise the Habitats Directive, there may be less need to restrict 
6 The SENSEI project, funded, ironically, by the EU.
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developers to conserve species and habitats common in the UK but scarce in Europe. 
This may be a bad time to be a great crested newt, or other species whose protection 
has been reinforced by being part of  ‘the common heritage of  Europe’. At the macro 
scale, the call to renegotiate or sever international connections and responsibilities was 
central to Donald Trump’s successful US presidential campaign, and his references 
to pursuing a programme of  ‘Brexit times ten’ should give pause for thought. Making 
supra-national public issues and the benefits of  international collaboration resonate in 
‘left-behind’ communities is an enduring challenge (Burningham and Thrush, 2001); 
so too is retaining their place on political agendas where government ministers express 
their desire to ‘repatriate our sovereignty’ (Hammond, 2016). Remarkably less visible 
in these conversations about sovereignty, identity and economic justice is any concern 
about corporate power – the scope for multinational businesses to extract outcomes 
that they want from the UK or local communities in a post-Brexit world.
Emphasis on national sovereignty does not automatically mean more open national 
decision-making, and the first months after the referendum show reflexes towards 
centralised control. Any moves to open up parliamentary scrutiny of  the govern-
ment’s Brexit strategy have been decried as thwarting ‘the will of  the people’. Closer 
examination of  the proposed Great Repeal Bill shows proposals to locate the power 
to retain, amend or repeal EU legislation with ministers, without the approval of  
Parliament – a potentially major reinforcement of  executive authority (Elliott, 2016). 
There are some countervailing pressures, however, notably devolution.
Devolution dimensions
Devolution in the UK adds further complexity to Brexit. The governments in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales all have particular priority issues: in Northern Ireland, 
there is anxiety that leaving the EU will lead to a ‘harder’ border with the Republic;7 
in Scotland, the 62 per cent vote in favour of  ‘remain’ is being presented as a mandate 
for a possible second independence referendum; in Wales, short-term access to EU 
structural funds and European markets have topped the agendas of  the first minister. 
Cutting across these issues, there are calls for the devolved nations to have a role in 
approving any proposed EU exit agreement, which, if  it does not contain membership 
of  the single market, they are unlikely to support. As the UK government renegotiates 
its relationship with Europe, domestic constitutional change is very much in the mix 
(Keating, 2016).
Although planning powers are already almost wholly devolved, environmental 
policy making is deeply entangled in these complexities. Constitutionally, environ-
mental policy is subject to significant devolution, meaning that both devolved 
7 Space does not permit attention to the border implications for Gibraltar, where 95 per cent of  voters supported 
remain.
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governments and the UK authorities have the responsibility to implement EU environ-
mental law and, potentially, the devolved governments would retain competencies in 
these areas post-Brexit (Woolford and Hunt, 2016). The devolved governments are 
very sensitive to risks of  ‘devolution reversal’; that in the exit process Westminster may 
take back powers, with the Great Repeal Bill being a concern.
Substantively, it raises the question whether the devolved governments will act 
to ‘hold the line’ on environmental standards and policies, where leaving the EU 
removes obligations that have underpinned a broadly consistent cross-UK approach. 
Planning practitioners in Wales are optimistic that the Welsh government’s green 
commitments and novel legislation, like the Future Generations Act, will prevent 
backsliding. However, being freed from UK norms is the key attraction of  devolution, 
and pressures to prioritise economic growth are just as keenly felt in the devolved 
territories.
Conclusions
Before drawing any conclusions, the reader should be reminded that this review 
reflects the time of  writing. It was finished in November 2016, with knowledge of  
speeches made at the Conservative Party conference, of  the prime minister’s inten-
tion to trigger Article 50, and of  various legal challenges to this process (see Table 1). 
Many things of  high importance remain to be decided and clearly this review could 
just be documenting the mood of  a particular moment. Out in the worlds of  practice, 
any ‘[i]nitial shock at the result has now morphed into cautious pragmatism’ (ENDS 
Report, 2016a, 6). Whether the UK remains part of  the single market is the most 
obvious pivotal decision. That prospect aside, very little has changed and – among 
planning professionals if  not environmental organisations – not much is expected to.
This raises wider questions about the experience and assessment of  change 
while living through it. As noted above, care is required to identify how European 
Union membership has affected planning in the UK over the years. Understanding 
‘effect’ means considering both changes to policy and the processes of  implementa-
tion, across diverse local contexts. However, there is little reason to believe that any 
‘de-Europeanisation’ of  British planning will be qualitatively different to 43 years 
of  Europeanisation: it will be incremental, uneven, often with tensions, not always 
explicit and not always heading in the expected direction (Fairbrass and Jordan, 
2001). As with previous processes of  Europeanisation, one should expect the planning 
community – as ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) – to shape the evolution of  
planning post-Brexit. One should also anticipate a gradual tailoring of  policy towards 
UK norms (House of  Lords, 2016). We may see a reassertion of  distinctive UK policy 
styles, tending to favour administrative discretion and flexibility (Jordan, 2002), and 
there may be many in the planning profession who would welcome a return to the 
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flexibility of  being able to assess the ‘material considerations’ of  the case over the 
rigidity of  EU regulations.
But there may also be substantive patterns in such incrementalism. In the present 
economic and political-economic setting, and looking at the agendas that received 
impetus from the referendum, one can readily imagine that any new domestic flexi-
bilities will be deployed to favour economic growth agendas. If  predicting a ‘race to 
the bottom’ might strain the meaning of  ‘race’, environmental professionals are right 
to be concerned about ‘a stroll to the bottom’ in environmental policy (EDIE, 2016a).
What makes the future especially hard to gauge is the shifting political context, 
which makes the era of  de-Europeanisation very different from the past. Rather 
than seeing planning and environmental policy as affected in a linear way by the 
EU referendum result, it is better to examine how EU membership, planning and 
environmental policy are all caught up in newer political divisions, made visible by the 
referendum result, which posits a clash between those comfortable with globalisation 
and reasonably trusting of  multi-level government, and those who are anxious about 
the costs, and express profound distrust in ‘establishments’ and ‘metropolitan elites’ 
perceived as ignoring them. What the public is feeling raises one set of  questions, but 
the politics raises others. Exiting the EU can be seen as a victory for libertarian free-
marketers and strands of  political nationalism which – although far from comfortable 
bedfellows – share a disaffection for ‘red tape’ and the established public sphere. The 
future issue for those engaged in planning and environmental policy is not just how to 
influence specific institutional measures arising from Brexit, but where and whether to 
find new alignments with this political direction of  travel, or challenge them.
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